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Wyschogrod: The Mathematical Model in Plato and Some Surrogates in a Jain The

6. The Mathematical Model in
Plato and Some Surrogates in a
Jain Theory of Knowledge*
Edith Wyschogrod

One of the generative questions in Benjamin Nelson's late work was:
What accounts for the breakthrough insights which permit the reduction
of all quality to quantity, the proclaiming of a mathematical reality behind
the experiential immediacies of experience, and the affirmation of a
homogeneous time and space the same throughout the universe, insights
which characterize Western science. It is a question that simultaneously
exercized Nelson and Joseph Needham, both consider it from an intercivilizational perspective. To put the matter in Needham's terms: "What
was it that happened in Renaissance Europe when mathematics and
science joined in a combination qualititatively new and destined to
transform the world?" 1
Nelson first answers these questions by examining Western orientations
and institutions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He shows that
in a "sacro-magical if sacramentalized" reading of creator and cosmos
"there appears a stress upon the need and ability of men to know and
explain natural phenomena by the principles of natural philosophy, to
offer rational justification of their acts and opinions."2 In the same context
Nelson speaks of a two-fold commitment to the "concrete individual
person," and to an "objective Universal." Armed with Nelson's questions
(the subject of fruitful conversations long before the appearance of the
article cited) I pondered the issues of whether these factors, already
nascent in the epistemic structure of Plato's dialogues concerned with the
Ideas, could not be displayed against an Indian system remarkably
similar in hierarchical structure and philosophic intent. For, I thought,

'This paper was first presented at the meeting of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations (U.S.) at Bradford College, Haverhill, Massachusetts in
April 1977.
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only in the light of these similarities would the key difference-the
existence of an "objective Universal" in one and not the other-emerge.
The same aim governs both the Platonic and Jain epistemologies, the
overcoming of sense experience in order to attain a more adequate access
route to truth. But, in the former, structures of universalization-the
ideas of number and geometric form-lead to this overcoming while in
the latter certain ad hoc extensions of sense itself are made to play this part.
My paper in no way attempts to ground larger claims such as the existence
of an ongoing tradition unbroken from Plato to the twelfth century. Nelson
would be the first to puncture so ominously unhistorical a claim. I attempt
rather to bring out the difference between a system which engages the
constructs of a contemporary mathematics and eventuates in an objective
Universal and one which fails to do so.
Both Plato and a Jain text, The Tattvarthadhigama Sutra of Sri Umasvati
with the commentary of Sri Pujyapada,3 argue that the knowledge of
sensibles is merely preliminary to higher forms of knowing and that these
in turn culminate in a highest or ultimate form of knowledge. Furthermore
both the Jain and Platonic systems concur in claiming necessity,
apodicticity and comprehensiveness or totalizing power for such
knowledge. In the light of these common considerations I argue here that
a difference in what are considered possible objects of knowledge by
each system accounts for the positing of differently conceived faculties
of knowledge. I argue further that the faculties alleged to attain higher
knowledge in Jain epistemology are compatible with the Jain understanding
of the objects of knowledge. Thus an internally consistent account of
knowing is provided in a scheme which assumes a) the actuality of the
material world but b) presupposes that knowledge of the world in some
sense falls short of ultimate truth and c) lacks mathematical paradigms for
providing a means of transition between the world of ordinary experience
and that of final knowledge.
In order to support these claims it is important to clarify in advance
how the possible objects of knowledge are understood in each system
and how the transition from lower to higher knowledge is effected.
In the Platonic account the move from lower to higher epistemological
levels is achieved by conferring a unique status upon a class of objects,
number and figure, which facilitates a transition between apprehension
of the empirical world and the world of Ideas. When applied to practical
ends these objects are still encumbered by visible images but when
divested of their concrete applications they are themselves Ideas. The
assumptions of arithmetic and geometry do not themselves constitute the
ultimate ground of certainty, for mathematical hypotheses which may
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appear certain to the mathematical sciences must be subjected to
philosophical analysis. Ultimate knowledge involves the systematic
relationship and harmony of the world of Forms in their hierarchical
nature and as they control the world of experience. Mathematical
knowledge is seen both as the model for and the prolegomenon to this
ultimate vision.
The Tattvarthadhigama Sutra shares at least this basic assumption with
the Platonic view: namely that there is a duplicity of Being which
generates the appearance of things as multiple and temporal. However
multiplicity and temporality themselves are not interpreted as giving rise
to the notion of objects as numerable, to the operation of counting as
such, leading in turn to a conception of number which can be freed from
its empirical context. 4 In consequence the transcendence of the spatiotemporal order must be achieved by the attempt to acquire transcendent
knowledge without recourse to elements and relations other than those
immediately given, those which the spatio-temporal continuum itself
directly presents. The conditions for transcending the spatio-temporal
world are seen as lodged within the perimeter of the world. Jain ontology
presumes the materiality of the world (including not only matter but
time, space and motion among its elements).5 No tertiary class of entities,
that is entities which are neither material (in the broad sense suggested)
nor spiritual, is predicated. Thus no object comparable to number and
figure incorporating both the permanence and stability of the ideal realm
and the multiplicity of the sensible realm is introduced. Only the world
itself can be predicated as the object of knowing through which access to
higher forms of knowledge can be acquired.
One further point remains to be clarified before pressing the claim that,
despite their common supposition that knowledge of sensibles is
preliminary to higher knowledge, the ontological status and character
ascribed to the objects of knowledge in each system will determine the
ground and structure of the faculties needed for the apprehension of
these objects. This point relates to the Jain understanding of the ontology
of sensibles. In the context of ordinary experience physical objects are so
arranged that they appear to be governed by inviolable rules such as the
rule that it is impossible for an observer to both be and not be in the same
place at a given instant. The Jain system supposes that the laws governing
temporal sequentiality and spatial contiguity are viable within the context
of ordinary experience, but relevant only to it. No immutable laws of nature
such as are assumed by Platonic or Aristotelean metaphysics which
would militate against the disruption of the perceived order of the world
are presupposed. The spatio-temporal order of nature is seen as
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applicable within the parameters set by sense experience but is nowhere
interpreted as having eternal and necessary status. 6
Since, as we have already seen, no entities comparable to mathematical
objects are posited the world of sensibles remains the only object of
knowledge. Thus a faculty which could provide the transition from lower
to higher knowledge must have the world (of objects and persons, etc.) as
its only cognitive sphere. Furthermore that faculty need not be governed
by the laws that sense perception leads one to believe are inherent in the
nature of things. Having laid down these premises, it becomes possible to
posit "supernormal" powers (clairvoyance and telepathy) as faculties
which can mediate the transition from sense perception to the final phase
of knowledge, omniscience. 7 These powers function as epistemological
alternatives to the mathematical model in Plato's account of knowing in
the sense of providing a link between graded levels of knowledge. But
rather than multiplying entities (as the ontological status conferred upon
Mathematical Ideas compels us to do) the Jain model assumes the
permeability of the physical and mental (a quasi-physical concept) 8
worlds to Spirit so that the occult powers predicated enable the adept to
penetrate the physical order.
The epistemological course chosen by Plato is to posit objects which
are neither entities found in the world nor mental "objects" corresponding
to them. Thus existents need not be "penetrated" or rearranged. Plato's
account of knowledge seeks to resolve the perplexity arising from "the
sea of change" by diverting attention from the world of aisthesis, that is from
"the world of sensations and judgments in accordance with them."9
Arithmetic as the science of number has this salutary effect for its objects
lack specific referents: "Arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect
compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling
against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument."10
Geometry, while making use of visible forms and reasoning about them is
not thinking about these "but of the ideals which they resemble, not of"
the figure geometers draw but of the absolute square and the absolute
diameter. l l The positing of mathematical objects makes it possible for the
mind to become the percipient rather than the eye.
For the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra and its commentator the soul's
percipience depends not upon the ontological status of the object beheld
but upon the elimination of karmic accumulation from the soul. Karma is
specific to the various modes of cognition. Thus to attain supernormal
powers the karma appropriate to preceding modes of cognition in
addition to the karma obscuring the power that the knower wishes to
achieve must be eliminated in order to "cut through" the world of
perception. 12 Compare Socrates' view of the soul's function:
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But in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the
unseen can make the world look upwards, and whether a man
gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some
particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of
that sort is a matter of science; his soul is looking downwards and
not upwards whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land,
whether he floats or only lies on his back. 13
with that of Sri Pujyapada:
The disciple asks the saint with reverence, "0 master, what is good
for the soul?" The Saint says, "Liberation." He again asks the saint
"What is the nature of this liberation, and what is the way to attain
it?" The saint answers, "Liberation is the attainment of an altogether
different state of the soul, on the removal of all the impurities of
karmic matter, and the body, characterized by all the inherent
qualities of the soul such as knowledge and bliss free from pain and
suffering."14
It is instructive from the standpoint of our argument (that objects of
knowledge determine the character of the faculty which apprehends
them) to notice the end or goal towards which knowledge in each case
tends. For Plato the object of genuine knowledge is being and the unseen
for which Mathematical Ideas provide the model. For Jain epistemology
the end of knowledge is freedom from attachment to the body and
liberation from the variety of standpoints according to which a thing may
be viewed. A fundamental doctrine of the Jain system holds that since
contradictory attributes may be predicated of a thing, no affirmation can
be regarded as absolutely true or false, the truth or falsity of an affirmation
depending upon the standpoint from which the affirmation is made. The
liberated soul transcends the relativity of viewpoint provided by modes
of knowledge less encompassing than total omniscience. 15 The motive
that engenders the quest for knowledge is the desire for release, for the
avoidance of pain, for infinite perception viz., for the knowledge of
substance without reference to its shifting conditions or modes.
The notion of standpoints which govern the apprehension of truth at
any given level of knowledge is foreign to Plato's conception of truth
since it is precisely the independence of mathematical truths from the
standpoint of the thinker and from the conditions of contingency
inhering in the sensible world which confers certainty upon the objects of
mathematics. While mathematics may be said to "liberate" from the
world of sensible objects, the knowledge to which it provides a link is not
that of undifferentiated oneness but rather to the hierarchically organized
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world of Forms governing the realm of experience. 16 The role of the Ideas
is crucial in this connection for it is through the Ideas that the many
particulars are integrated into a totalizing scheme: the many sensibles may
be united through participation in a single Idea. While this doctrine is
governed by the notion of "one over many" as Aristotle alleges, it need
not be interpreted as presupposing that Plato understands the Ideas in a
univocal sense. In fact a number of interpretations is proferred each of
which can still be subsumed under the conception" one over many."
Plato means to include as Ideas: ethical and aesthetic notions such as
those of the Good, of Justice, of Beauty; Ideas of metaphysical notions
such as the One and the Many, Being and Non-Being etc.; Mathematical
Ideas such as those of the circle, the diameter etc. of the geometer and
numbers such as two, three etc. of the arithmetician; Ideas of natural
kinds such as man, stone, etc.; Ideas for kinds of manufactured objects,
tables, chairs, beds etc. 17 In each of these instances Plato is guided by the
notion that many particulars participate in a single Idea.
In Jain epistemology there are no such organizing archetypes enabling
the lower to be taken up into the higher through participation (as the
lower deriving its being from the higher). While Jain epistemology
recognizes a number of cognitive modes-sense perception, scriptural
knowledge, clairvoyance and telepath y l 8 - no object of these modes serves
simultaneously as an object of knowledge and an organizing principle for
objects of an onto logically lower level. The indicator for epistemological
difference is karma, since each cognitive mode is obscured by its own
karmic variant.
Higher forms of cognition presuppose the destruction of karma so that
the knowledge conferred by the higher faculties manifests itself upon the
ground of the soul. Such knowledge is termed "direct" (without the
intermediation of the sense organs) and eliminates the temporal and
spatial sequentiality characteristic of indirect cognitive modes. Direct
knowledge is seen to be independent of what we might term "incoming
data." The data given to the higher faculties are not different in kind from
those of sense experience and its derivatives: rather they are perceived
without relation to events contiguous to the observer and organized
without reference to the modes of organizing data characteristic of
ordinary experience. It is thus not the character of the data which changes
but rather their principles of organization.
It would seem that the adept apprehends data in their plenary presence
but we take it that two independent series of data are juxtaposed so that
two discrete series are experienced as a single event. Thus event A (let us
say the death of a man in Bengal) belongs to a series of events (viewed
spatially) that are accessible only to those in his immediate vicinity in
Bengal. A quite different series of events is accessible to observer A' in
Gujarat. Two series of events normally unconnected by relations of
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proximity are now linked through the interest of observer A' in the death
of the man in Bengal. Clairvoyance enables the adept to implement his
"interest" by bringing into contiguity in the mind of a single observer two
disparate series. The power of the observer is able to transcend the
normal relations of temporal and spatial sequentiality through the
development of a power which no longer requires the presence of
physical objects in order for perception of these objects to take place.
An analogous case is made for telepathy: one grasps what another is
thinking without reference to spoken utterance. While the theoretical
suppositions underlying the relations of language to thought are not
stated in the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra nor in the commentary, it would
appear (however) that thinking is an infra-auditory linguistic process, a
form of speaking which can be understood by one who possesses the
appropriate faculty.
It is instructive to notice how the Sutra regards specific types of
clairvoyance and telepathy. Two modes of clairvoyance are posited, one
based on birth the other produced by the tranquillization and annihilation
of karmic matter depending upon merit. 19 There are also two varieties of
telepathy: one "straight," the other "curved" or winding. "Straight"
telepathy enables the adept to acquire knowledge of "speech, body and
mind" when these are the objects in the mind of another. "Curved"
telepathy need not have recourse to objects; it attains access to past and
future. The temporal extensiveness of the two differs in that the former is
alleged to cover only several births; its spatial range is thought to cover in
distance from two to eight miles but not beyond it. The latter is said to
cover from seven to eight births in the past and future of oneself and
others and is said to range spatially from eight miles "up to the entire
abode of human beings."2o
The doctrine underlying these examples, namely that preceding
existences can be recalled, ought not to be confused with the Platonic
doctrine of recollection. In the Meno we notice that recollection is of
principles, their application being a matter of deductive inference. Thus
knowledge of the nature of squares and triangles enables one to deduce
the relationship between the area of a square and the length of its sides
and to then recognize that if one wishes to construct a square whose area
will be twice the length of its sides one cannot do so by doubling the
length of the sides. 21 For Plato knowledge derived from recollection does
not yield information about sense experiences but knowledge of general
principles.
Moreover, the primary purpose in introducing the recollection theory,
as the Phaedo clearly establishes, is to demonstrate the pre-existence of
the soul. In the Phaedo Plato presumes archetypal forms and copies which
resemble them. An ideal standard must be known before a judgement
can be made about sense particulars, that all sensible things aim at this
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standard but fall short of it,22 and furthermore that we "acquire this
knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it." The
position is summarized thus:
Then may we not say ... that ... there is an absolute beauty, and
goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if this which is
now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our
sensation, and with this compare them finding these ideas to be preexistent and our inborn possessions-then our soul must have had
a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the
argument. 23
It is only in the Republic that mathematical knowledge provides the
same function as clairvoyance and telepathy in the Jain system, since it is
here that mathematical knowledge is seen as the stepping stone between
the world of appearances and that of intelligible forms. Here a new view
of knowledge is put forward which assumes the centrality of dialectic, a
method of philosophical analysis conducted without reliance upon the
data of sense perception and credited with being able to arrive at
unquestioned first principles. In the simile of the line, Plato divides the
intelligible world into two regions: that of mathematics and that of
dialectic, each characterized by methodological differences in the attainment of its conclusions. The former may still use visible representations
of its constructs while the latter is occupied with purely intelligible
forms.24 Furthermore both begin from hypotheses, the mathematician
treating them as if they were first principles and arriving at conclusions
without questioning initial assumptions, the dialectician treating hypotheses as hypotheses and nothing more. Dialectic recognizes the tentative
character of hypotheses and uses them only to arrive at first principles. It
is then possible to retrace the steps involved in reverse order and thus,
descending, to arrive at conclusions which are solidly founded. 25
Accordingly the verification of the principles of arithmetic and geometry
is not a matter of probable induction starting from particular facts of sense
experience but is obtained by logical deduction from self-evident first
principles.
The Jain logician also recognizes deduction as a legitimate mode of
inference. Thus (to cite a common example) observing smoke on the hill,
and knowing the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, we are led to
conclude that there is fire in the hill. But, the Jain logician argues that the
premises themselves are based on sense experience and therefore
deductive inference counts as sense knowledge. The same karma which
obstructs sense experience is also alleged to obstruct correct inference.
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Such knowledge is, in fact, classified as "indirect" in contradistinction to
clairvoyance and telepathy. Jain epistemology stresses that "sensory
cognition, remembrance, recognition, induction and deduction are
synonyms,"26 since the karma obstructing each is of the same type. In this
sense the Jain view is close to that of simple empiricism in maintaining
that (short of omniscience) knowledge is based upon the percepts and
their relations.
Despite its inner coherence, the difficulties of a scheme which depends
upon the violation of basic physical principles is obvious. However the
Jain system manages to maintain a certain economy by avoiding the
multiplication of entities qualitatively different from those found in the
world of appearances. 27 In the Platonic scheme not only are ideal entities
posited such as the Mathematical Ideas but, to make sense of these, other
additional entities are required. Aristotle argues that Plato considered it
necessary to furnish ideal perfect instances of the Mathematical Ideas and
so posited the existence of intermediate ideal objects, Mathematical
Numbers, involving the existence of identical units which are multiple
like sense particulars but share the mode of being of eidetic entities. 28
Mathematical Numbers thus removed some difficulties in the understanding of mathematical operations engendered by the view that
Mathematical Ideas are themselves unique and nonassociable through
arithmetic processes such as addition etc. Aristotle summarizes the case
thus: "Some (Plato) say both kinds of numbers exist that which has a
before and after being identical with Ideas and Mathematical Numbers
being different from the Ideas and sensible things."29 Aristotle
characterizes the Mathematical Numbers as being made up of ideal units
or ones each of which is identical with every other. "Mathematical
Number is counted thus-after 1, 2 (which consists of another 1 besides
the former 1) and 3 (which consists of another 1 besides those two), and
the other numbers similarly." Comparable geometrical entities are also
presumed to have been posited by Plato. 30
This view of arithmetic structure permits solution of what has been
called the" ontological methexis" problem, that is the question of how
each object remaining solidary (monadic) can combine with other
objects into groups or assemblages. The solution is suggested by the
nature of Ideal and Mathematical Numbers. Existing objects can participate
in a genus since the genus exhibits the mode of being of arithmos, that is it
exhibits the mode of being of each ideal number, yet its members, like the
homogeneous monads in the realm of Mathematical Number (which are
themselves outside change and time) can nevertheless be arranged into
definite numbers. 31 It is clear that for Plato the sense world is transcended
by organizing the multiplicity of sensibles into more comprehensive

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 10 [1985], No. 10, Art. 8
82

CIVILIZA TIONS EAST AND WEST

assemblages and by using the objects of arithmetic and geometry to
provide a model for the world of Forms. The Jain scheme depends on no
such model for its assumption is that while knowledge of sensibles can
become increasingly comprehensive, no objects or relations in that
world, and no faculty commensurate with it, however complex, can serve
as a paradigm for ultimate knowledge. For Jain epistemology no mode of
cognition will satisfy apart from total omniscience in the sense ascribed to
it in the body of this paper.

NOTES

1. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1954- ), III, p. 150.
2. Benjamin Nelson, "Sciences and Civilizations, 'East' and 'West: Joseph Needham
and Max Weber," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science II (1974):445-493.
3. The Tathvarthadhigama Sutra of Sri Umasvati was composed as early as the period of
the oldest Jain commentaries and crystallizes an early and much respected epistemological
tradition. Its date is given as 300 A. D. The commentary of Sri Pujyapada is the oldest extant
commentary on the Sutra and accepted as definitive by the logician Sri Akalanka Deva in his
Rajavartika. The Sutra together with the commentary will be taken as representative of the
Jain epistemological literature. See Preface to Tathvarthadhigama Sutra of Sri U masvati with
the commentary of Sri Pujyapada translated by S. A. Jain (Calcutta: Vira Sasana Sangha,
1960). An exhaustive list of translations of the Sutra can be found in Karl Potter (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. I (Delhi: Institute for Indian Studies by Motilal
Banarsidas, 1970). This essay follows the translation of S. A. Jain cited above.
4. I do not allege the absence of mathematical speculation during the formative period
of Indian philosophy or afterwards since such an assertion is both contrary to fact and
besides the point. I do not believe that the mathematical model does not provide the
criteria governing the determination of truth in the Indian philosophical systems. Beyer in
A History of Mathematics (John Wiley and Sons, 1968) writes that our notation for integers
and an equivalent of the sine function in trigonometry are significant ancient Indian
contributions (p. 237). However, there is a marked lack of continuity of tradition so that
such events are sporadic (p. 229).
5. The non-living (ajiva) encompasses an elaborate structure including not only matter
but time, space and motion among its elements. For general accounts see Surendrenath
Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963), pp. 189-190 and pp. 195-198. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1923), pp. 312-325. M. Hiriyanna, Essentials of Indian Philosophy
(George Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 62 ft. and P. T. Rau, The Philosophical Traditions of India
(London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1971). For detailed accounts see S. T. Stevenson, The
Heart of Jainism (London: H. Milford, 1915), pp. 106 ff. Walter Schubring, The Religion of the
Jailzas, tr. by Amulachandra Sen and T. C. Burke (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1966), pp. 16-18.
and Mohan Lal Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy (Bangalore: Jain Mission Society, 1954),
pp. 26 ft.
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6. The Jain doctrine of anekanta presumes that there is no privileged vantage point from
which judgments may be made. All knowledge is relative to the standpoint of the observer:
sense experience is only one of a variety of modes of experience. Jain epistemology holds
that an object can be viewed from different points of view: existent, non-existent, one, many,
identical, different, etc. Every object possesses indefinite attributes (dharmas) which are
taken as actually existing in the object. When making a judgment the observer selects an
aspect of the object. The term Syat is used to designate a particular point of view, i.e. from
this aspect the object is such and not otherwise. For example, from the point of view of his
father Anand is a son, but from the point of view of his brother he isa brother etc. The object
itself is anekanta, a substratum which bears numerous characteristics.
Judgments regarding any object can be made in seven ways: Using the often cited clay pot
as an example, perspectival judgments can be schematized as follows:
1. Relatively the pot exists.
2. Relatively the pot does not exist.
3. Relatively the pot does and does not exist (although not in the same respect).
4. Relatively the pot is indescribable.
5. Relatively the pot exists and is indescribable.
6. Relatively the pot does not exist and is indescribable.
7. Relatively the pot exists, does not exist and is indescribable.
Where the law of contradiction appears to be violated the conjunctive expression is to be
taken as designated different standpoints from which each conjunct can be seen as true, i.e.
true from that limited point of view. See Mohan Lal Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, pp.
117 ff.
7. The Jain canons consider knowledge as divided into five categories: abhinibodhika,
sruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala (perception, scripture, clairvoyance, telepathy and
total knowledge respectively). Two broad divisions are later added under which these five
are subsumed: pratyoksha and paraksha (direct and indirect respectively). Perception is, in
the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, counted as indirect as is scriptural knowledge. See Mohan Lal
Mehta, Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, pp. 85 ff. and Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy
(Benares: Jain Cultural Research Society, 1951), SanmatiPublication number six, pp. 61-70.
8. The notion of what constitutes the mental realm is quite complicated in Indian
systems. Suffice it to say that such functions as perceiving, deducing, willing, etc. are seen to
be "mental" and belong to the materiality of the world as contradistinct from the power of
spirit which cannot be reduced to mental acts. See Mohan Lal Mehta for the Jain application
of this principle, p. 97.
9. See Norman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Methuen and Co. Lts.,
1962), p. 48.
10. Republic VII, 526
11. Republic VI, 510.
12. See Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, chapter IV, Mohan Lal Mehta, Outlines of
Jaina Philosophy, chapter VI for detailed discussion of jain doctrine of karma. An older
account can be found in Jagmanderlal Jaini, Outlines oflainism (Cambridge University Press,
1916), pp. 26 ff.
13. Republic VII, 529.
14. Sri Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 1 f.
15. Mailisena Syadvamanjari, A Commentary on the Examination of the Thirty-two Stanzas of
Hemacandra, XXIII. For general accounts of this view see Dasgupta, A History of Indian
Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 179 f., and Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 294 f. Bimal K.
Matilal in Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague:
Mouton, 1971) contrasts the Jaina doctine with that of the Advaitins and the Madhyamikas.
The latter two regard the character of the phenomenal world as indeterminable: it is not a
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merely fictive phenomenal realm but has a provisional existence, neither real nor unreal.lts
character is logically indeterminable. For the Nyaya- Vaisesikaany theory as to the character
of phenomenality can be a valid theory concerning the character of the real: cause and effect
are taken to be actual relations and the theory of causality a valid theory. The Madhyamika
not only reject the validity of the claims of any theory of the phenomenal world but claim
further that no theory concerning its character can be demonstrated. All such theories can
be shown to be internally inconsistent. The Jaina takes a stand midway between these views
arguing that each theory of the phenomenal world is consistent with a standpoint, but not
absolutely valid. Thus if x is a particular theory of reality, given certain presuppositions
from which x follows, an interpretation can be given to x such that x is true. Foran account of
the Jain doctrine of "tropes" or the acknowledgement of the validity of the positions of other
Indian epistemological schools as partial views of the truth see P. T. Rau, The Philosophical
Traditions, pp. 98 ff.
16. Since the mathematician may begin by studying sensible phenomena and then
proceed to intelligible forms, the double interest results in a double function for
mathematics: as propaedeutic to the knowledge of intelligible realities and as an instrument
for describing and arranging the everyday world. See Robert Brumbaugh, The Role of
Mathematics in Plato's Dialectic (Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1942), p. 70.
17. I am indebted to Anders Wedberg, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematic, (Stockholm:
Almquist and Wiksell, 1955), p. 32 for this classification.
18. The Jain canons (See Supra note 9) do not change in the Sutra in this regard. The
claim is made that this conception predates Lord Mahavira (the most recent founder and
twenty-fourth tirthankara of Jainism).
19. Sri Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 33.
20. Sri Pujyapada, pp. 34 ff.
21. Meno.
22. Norman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 28.
23. Phaedo, 75.
24. For the Pythagorean background of the physical representation of number see W. K.
C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), pp. 242 ff. For the extent to which mathematical representation is said to characterize
non-mathematical cases see Robert Brumbaugh, Plato's Mathematical Imagination.
25. See T. Heath,A History of Greek Mathematics Vol. 1. (Oxford University Press, 1921), p.
290; Anders Wedberg Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 103 ff. and Richard Robinson,
"Hypothesis in Plato," Gregory V1astos (ed.), Plato (Doubleday, 1971), pp. 110 f. The position
is summarized in Plato's Republic 511 thus:
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to
speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of
dialectic, using the hypotheses, not as first principles, but only as hypotheses-that is
to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in
order that she may soar beyond them to the first principles of the whole; and clinging
to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps sh" descends
again without the aid of any sensible objects, from ideas through ideas, and in ideas
she ends.
26. Sri Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 21.
27. This means only to apply to idea entities as ideal number but not to processes which
in Jainism include action, time, space, motion, rest etc. See Supra, note 3.
28. The passages in The Philebus, 56c-59d and 61d-62b are interpreted by Wedberg as
providing evidence for the accuracy of Aristotle's account in that they point to a separation
between dialectic and philosophical arithmetic, the latter described as the study of numbers
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which are not Ideas. These passages are also seen as pointing to eternal exemplars of
geometrical Ideas. See Anders Wedberg, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics.
29. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1080 b, 11-14.
30. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1080 a, 30-33. See Leon Robin, La theorie platonicie/me des
idees et des nombres, p. 625. Anders Wedberg, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 116 ff.
31. Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Modem Algebra (Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1968), pp. 90 ff, and pp. 100 f. adds to this
discussion by citing Aristotle's refutation of the Platonic view based on the mode of
being Plato ascribes to mathematical objects (Metaphysics, 1076 a, 36 ff). Aristotle argues for
the natural meaning of arithmos: "To be present in number is to be some number of a given
object," (Physics, A 12, 22, 1 b). Attributes such as white, round, etc., are arrived at by
disregarding certain other attributes of a thing enabling one to extrapolate a quality apart
from its contextual nexus. This quality can be predicated of other objects where, in turn,
certain other qualities had been similarly disregarded. By subjecting the aistheta to this
procedure, numerical aspects of being can be ascertained. Number is no longer subject to
the senses, yet it does not have any independent ontological status. The mind tends to
"think the mathematical objects which are not separate as if they were separate when it
thinks them." (De A/lima, 7, 431 b).
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